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Fetal Tissue Implants: An Explosive
Technology Needs National Action
I. Introduction
"Researchers hope that by implanting certain tissues of dead
fetuses, which have been removed from the womb during abortions,
they could dramatically improve the treatment of a score or more
intractable afflictions, ranging from Parkinson's disease and diabetes
to sickle-cell anemia, some forms of cancer and even strokes."'
The prospect of such fetal tissue implants, only recently deemed
possible,' has refueled the on-going debate on abortion3 and raised
ethical' and legal 5 questions of enormous complexity. Imagine the
following scenario: A child is diagnosed with juvenile diabetes. She
must take daily insulin shots for the rest of her life.6 She is at risk
for a multitude of health problems as well as for a possible early
death.7 Her parents know that by conceiving another child, aborting
it, and transplanting the fetal pancreatic eyelet cells into the pan-
creas of their daughter, a cure is quite possible.8 Can they legally do
this? If they can, should the law continue to allow it? If they cannot,
is another source of fetal tissue legally available? If not, should there
be?
1. Clark, Gosnell, Hager, Should Medicine Use the Unborn?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14,
1987, at 62 [hereinafter Should Medicine].
2. Id.
3. Lewin, Medical Use of Fetal Tissues Spurs New Abortion Debate, N.Y. Times, Aug.
16, 1987, at A30, col. 5. (Statement of Dr. John C. Willke, president of the National Right-to-
Life Committee that "people who kill these tiny developing babies, by virtue of the fact that
they have done the killing, lose any moral right to use those tissues."). Compare id. at A30,
col. 5. (Stating the fears of supporters of the right of a woman to have an abortion that the
new technologies will be seen as evidence that the fetus is a person from the moment of
conception.).
4. See generally Mahowald, Silver, Ratcheson, The Ethical Options in Transplanting
Fetal Tissue, 17 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 9 (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter Ethical Options].
5, For a discussion of federal and state regulations that do not specifically address fetal
implants, see Terry, 'Alas! Poor Yorick. I Knew Him Ex Utero': The Regulation of Embryo
and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV.
419 (1986).
6. W.B. SAUNDERS Co., DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 369 (26th ed.
1985).
7. 2 H.S. STUTTMAN, INC., FISHBEIN'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL AND HEALTH ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 456, 458 (1985).
8. Commentators have included diabetes as one of the diseases that may respond to fetal
cell implants. A diabetic patient, Jerry Mispagel, had fetal eyelet cells transplanted along with
a new kidney. He reports that the operation "made me so I could live a normal life." Today
(NBC television broadcast, Oct. 7, 1987).
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This Comment will examine the use of fetal tissue implants in
humans.9 It will focus upon the availability of using fetal tissue for
implants in the United States once the procedures have proven effec-
tive. What follows is a survey of the federal and state regulations
currently in place on this subject as well as the existing case law that
may control the use of fetal tissue. Critical examination of these reg-
ulations and the case law interpreting them, illustrates the inade-
quacy of the current state of the law with regard to the use of this
explosive new technology. The Comment concludes with recommen-
dations for governmental action on a national scale.
II. Medical Possibilities
In April 1987, The New England Journal of Medicine reported
a new breakthrough in the possible treatment of Parkinson's dis-
ease.10 The new therapy involves transplanting tissue from the pa-
tient's own adrenal gland to the affected section of the patient's
brain," resulting in a dramatic and lasting improvement in symp-
toms." Such neural transplantation has been done in animal models
using fetal instead of adrenal tissue transplants. 13 In the animal
models, the disease is essentially reversed. 4 While heralding the ad-
renal-to-brain transplants, 5 speculation continues that human fetal
9. Beyond the scope of this Comment are the legal restrictions in the United States upon
the experimental research that is necessary to determine the possible use of fetal implants on
the treatment of medical illnesses. Many of the restrictions discussed in this Comment make
such research extremely problematic in the United States. See generally Terry, supra note 5;
THE NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, reprinted in 40
Fed. Reg, 33,530 (1975) [hereinafter RESEARCH ON THE FETUS]; Fletcher & Schulman, Fetal
Research: The State of the Question, 15 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 6 (April 1985). Research now
being done abroad indicates that it is likely that the technology will be perfected elsewhere. In
West Germany, physicians have recently transplanted fetal kidneys into three patients. See
Should Medicine, supra note I, at 63. In the near future, researchers in Sweden are planning
to use fetal brain transplants to treat some patients suffering from Parkinson's disease. Lewin,
supra note 3, at A30, col. 2. Such treatment has recently been done in Mexico. See infra note
17 and accompanying text.
10. Madrazo, Drucker-Colin, Diaz, Martinez-Mata, Torres, Becerril, Open Microsurgi-
cal Autograft of Adrenal Medulla to the Right Candidate Nucleus in Two Patients with
Intractable Parkinson's Disease, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 831 (1987). Parkinson's disease is a
syndrome responsible for serious physical disability, especially among the elderly. Victims
gradually lose their motor function and limbs can become rigid. Patients lose facial expression,
have difficulty swallowing and speaking. Moore, Parkinson's Disease - A New Therapy?, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 872 (1987).
II. Id.
12. Id. at 873.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. For articles in non-medical terms on the significance of the medulla to brain trans-
plants, see Begley, Harmes, Transplants in the Brain, NEWSWEEK, April 13, 1987, at 64;
Merz, Adrenal-to-Brain Transplants Improve the Prognosis for Parkinson's Disease, 257 J.
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tissue implants promise even more success, 6 not only with Parkin-
son's disease but with a host of other neurological disorders as well.
In early January, 1987 surgeons in Mexico City successfully grafted
fetal tissue into the brains of two Parkinson's victims. Improvement
has been dramatic in the two patients. Because abortion is illegal in
Mexico, the tissue came from a miscarried fetus.1 7 According to re-
ports in the popular press, this technology also promises results with
Alzheimer's di'sease, Huntington's Chorea, spinal cord injuries, dia-
betes, leukemia, blindness, aplastic anemia, stroke, brain damage
from injury, and hypogonadism.'6
Because of its unique characteristics, scientists perceive fetal tis-
sue as better transplant material than other human tissue. It is im-
munologically reactive, meaning that it causes less rejection by the
host body. 9 It grows much faster than adult tissue. 0 In addition,
fetal cells are more adaptable and, therefore, they are able to make
the new nerve connections necessary to render these therapies effec-
tive. The effectiveness of this remedy is due to the ability of the fetal
cells to take over the functions of the unhealthy cells.2"
A few reported instances of fetal cell use already show promis-
ing results. 2 Dr. Robert Gale of the University of California, Los
Angeles used fetal liver cells with three of the victims he treated
after the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster in the Soviet Union. He
hoped the cells would generate bone marrow; however, the patients
died from burns before the results could be known.23 Dr. Kevin Laf-
ferty of the University of Colorado is implanting pre-insulin produc-
ing cells from fetal pancreases to treat diabetes.2 Dr. Abraham Lie-
berman of New York University Medical Center says of fetal cell
implants in brain transplants, "Itihis is to medicine what supercon-
ductivity is to physics." 25 Indeed, one researcher has pointed out that
AM. MED. A. 2691 (1987); Lewin, Brain Grafts Benefits Parkinson's Patients, 236 SCIENCE,
April 10, 1987, at 149.
16. See supra note I, at 62. For specific scientific articles on animal fetal cell implants,
see Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
17. Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49.
18. Id.; Should Medicine, supra note I, at 62; Thorne, Trade in Human Tissue Needs
Regulation, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1987, at 16, col. 3; Lewin, supra note 3.
19. Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10; Lewin, supra note 3, at A30, col. 1.
20. Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
21. Should Medicine, supra note 1, at 62.
22. Id. at 62-63. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 62.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id. at 62. In a recent interview, Dr. Lieberman amplified this thought:
If you an unlock the secrets of why cells grow and how they grow and how
they learn to make certain proteins and shut off certain proteins then you can
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this technology "has proven to this point to reverse every kind of
neurological disorder that has been placed before it."2
Obviously the possibilities inherent in such a technology raise a
host of ethical and legal questions. A sampling from recent press
reports addresses only some of the issues to be confronted.27 For ex-
ample, will this new technology make abortion more legitimate as
right-to-life groups fear?28 Will it exploit women?2 9 Is it unethical to
conceive in order to abort? 30 Is it unethical not to use a technology
that is so beneficial?31 If fetal tissue is used, is our society sliding
down a slippery slope towards the utilitarian use of one life for the
benefit of another?
32
III. Current Legal Restrictions
Legal limits on this use of fetal tissue depend largely on how
such tissue is defined, i.e., the gestational age of the tissue re-
quired, 33 whether it is from a fetus or embryo,34 and whether it is
start to reverse many of the neuro-degenerative diseases that we see: Parkinson's,
Alzheimer's, spinal cord injury, people that have suffered stroke. And then you
can say to yourself as you age and as you get older, and your reflexes slow down:
"Why is that so?" Well, ultimately it's on a neural basis and the potential is
there that you're going to open up the fountain of youth.
All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 23, 1987).
26. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 23, 1987, interview-
ing Dr. John Slaydek, Chairman of the Neurobiology Department at the University of
Rochester).
27. See Should Medicine, supra note I, at 62; Thorne, supra note 17, at 16, col. 3;
Lewin, supra note 3, at AI, col. 5.
28. See Lewin, supra note 3.
29. See generally Schiavoni, Individual Reproductive Rights v. State Interest, 59 Wis.
BAR BULL., Sept. 1986, at 18 (summarizing recent developments in the law as they impact on
women's reproductive rights, particularly when new technology, promoted as giving new
choices to women, actually becomes compulsory).
30. Lewin, supra note 3, at Al, col. 5 (A woman called Arthur Caplan, director of the
University of Minnesota Center for Biomedical Ethics, to ask if she could be artificially insem-
inated with her father's sperm, abort the resulting fetus, and use its brain tissue to relieve her
father's suffering from Alzheimer's disease. Responding that it is not yet technically possible
and also ethically wrong, Dr. Caplan said, "This is the ultimate issue of intergenerational
justice. You're not just asking for the pocketbooks of the young - you're asking for body
parts.").
31. Today (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 7, 1987) (interviewing Dr. Robert Gale: "if
there is something available to help someone, to not do it is in a certain way unethical."). See
also Lewin, supra note 3, at AI, col. 5 (also quoting Dr. Gale: "All of us that work in fetal
research feel that, if someone has decided to have an abortion and gives permission, it is all
right to use that tissue to help someone else. But despite our intellectual belief that this is
right, we understand why there is controversy.").
32. Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 14.
33. The age of the tissue may be essential to achieve success. In experimentation with
rats, the best results have been achieved by using tissue from mid-gestation or earlier. Ethical
Options, supra note 4, at 10 citing Gage, Bjorklund, Intracerebral Grafting of Neuronal Cell
Suspensions into the Adult Brain, 1984 CNS TRAUMA 45-56. There is yet no agreement on
the age of tissue for best results with brain implants. Some doctors say a nine-week fetus is
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taken in-utero or ex-utero.3 5 Two major legal limitations on the use
of fetal tissue implants depend largely upon whether such tissue is
from a dead fetus or from a non-viable but living fetus 6 and how
these implants are defined." Because many of the proposed proce-
dures call for tissue with a gestational age of under twelve weeks, 38
this Comment focuses upon the legalities of using tissue from a non-
viable 9 fetus ex-utero. Such tissue has been compared to cadaver
tissue; 0 however, there is a significant difference between the two
because the fetal brain may not yet be dead."'
A. Fetal Tissue as Cadaver Tissue: Legal Implications
Federal regulations define a dead fetus as "a fetus ex-utero
which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity,
spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the
umbilical cord (if still attached).""2 These regulations leave activities
involving the dead fetus or fetal material to state and local regula-
tion. s While there is specific state legislation governing the disposal
of fetal remains,"' the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), 5
optimal, while others believe an older fetus would be better. See Lewin, supra note 3, at A30,
col. 2.
34. Fetuses and embryos have different legal status. Federal regulations define a fetus as
"the product of conception from the time of implantation (as evidenced by any of the pre-
sumptive signs of pregnancy, such as missed menses, or a medically acceptable pregnancy test)
until a determination is made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus, that it is viable,"
45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1986). The regulations do not apply these regimes to embryos. See
generally Terry, supra note 5, at 456.
35. For a discussion on the differences in treatment, see RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra
note 9.
36. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.203(e), (f) (1986).
37. RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 9, at 33,532, 33,547-58.
38. See supra note 32.
39. Federal regulations define the terms, viable, non-viable, and dead. See infra notes
42, 113-14 and accompanying text. There is, however, no coherent medical and legal agree-
ment on these terms. See generally Levine, Viability and Death of the Human Fetus: Biologic
Definitions, 23 CLINICAL RESEARCH 211-76 (1975); Kass, Determining Death and Viability in
Fetuses and Abortuses, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, APPENDIX TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
RESEARCH ON THE FETUS I I DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-128 (1975) [hereinafter Appendix];
Behrman, Rosen, Report on Viability and Non-Viability of the Fetus, Appendix, DHEW Pub.
No. (OS) 76-128 (1975).
40. Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
41. Id.
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1986).
43. 45 C.FR. § 46.210 (1986). "Activities involving the dead fetus, mascerated fetal
material, or cells, tissue, - or organs excised from a dead fetus shall be conducted only in
accordance with any applicable state or local laws regarding such activities." Id.
44. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
45. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1983 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
UAGA].
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which addresses the use of organs and tissue from the dead,"' may
also be applicable.
The UAGA has been passed in some form by all fifty states."7
In twenty-five of those states, the UAGA is the only regulation gov-
erning the use of dead fetal tissue.' 8 The Act states that "[d]ecedent
means a deceased individual and includes a still-born infant or fe-
tus."49 The definition of body part includes tissues. 0 The UAGA al-
lows either parent to consent to such tissue donation as long as the
other does not object.51 It provides for the naming of a specific do-
nee,52 and mandates that the physician who certifies the death shall
not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting the
body part. 53 The UAGA specifically leaves the issue of compensation
for body parts, including tissue, to the states."'
Several problems are evident in using the UAGA to regulate
the use of fetal tissue in brain transplants. As noted, the UAGA goes
to great lengths to remove any possible conflict of interest between
the physician certifying death and the physician transplanting the
body part.55 Although the Act permits the use of body parts from a
stillborn fetus or infant if the parent consents, it is silent on the con-
flict of interest that might arise between the decision to elect an
abortion and the decision to donate fetal tissue to a specific donee. 5"
The potential for a conflict of interest is even greater when concep-
tion occurs with the intention of aborting and using the resulting
46. Id. § l(b)-(e).
47. For a listing of jurisdictions adopting the UAGA, see UAGA, supra note 45, at 2.
48. Several states have passed legislation that restricts or bans the use of dead fetal
tissue. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
49. UAGA, supra note 45, at 30 (Q I(b)).
50. Id. at 30 (§ I(e)).
51. Id. at 34 (Q 2(b)(3)).
52. Id. at 41 (Q 3(4)).
53. Id. at 59 (Q 7(b)).
54. Id. at 41 (Q 3 comment). "The statutes in a few states specify that no donor shall
ask compensation and no donee shall receive it. Several statutes provide that storage banks
shall be non-profit organizations. On the other hand, most of the states have chosen not to deal
with this question. The Uniform Act follows the latter course in this regard." But see National
Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 273, § 274 (Supp. 1984) (prohibiting organ sales). See
also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
55. UAGA, supra note 45, at 59 (Q 7(b)).
56. While federal regulations mandate the informed consent of the mother when fetal
research is to be conducted, this position has not been reached without heated debate. See
RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 9, at 33,537-33,540 (summarizing the ethical debate
presented to the Commission by reports and papers of ethicists). See also Appendix, supra
note 39, at 2-10 (full text of these papers and reports). But see Horan, Fetal Experimentation
and Federal Regulation, 22 VILL. L. REv. 325, 333-38 (1976-77) (arguing that parents do not
have the right to consent to non-therapeutic medical procedures for their children and analo-
gizing the living non-viable fetus ex utero to a child).
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tissue for a brain transplant for a specific person.
Another problem which may arise in applying the UAGA to
fetal implants is the Act's requirement that a donee shall not accept
a gift if the donee has notice that either the decedent or one of the
parents opposes the gift." As there are strong and opposing feelings
about abortion, the reverse might also be true. It can be argued that
a donee should be informed that fetal cells designated for their use
came from an elected abortion.
Moreover, a problem with the UAGA has developed because of
the lack of restrictions upon compensation for body parts.59 In 1984,
the National Organ Transplant Act addressed this issue by prohibit-
ing the transfer of any human organ for valuable consideration.60
The term organ, as defined in this section prohibiting compensation,
does not include tissue.6" Therefore, unless addressed by a state stat-
ute,62 dead fetal tissue can be sold. If this area remains unregulated
at a national level, the availability of fetal tissue for brain implants
may depend upon one's geographical location.
Twenty-five states" have specific legislation which tends to un-
57. Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 15, citing Warren, Maquire, Levine, Can the Fetus
Be an Organ Farm?, 8 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 23 (Oct. 1978).
58. UAGA § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1983).
59. See generally Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. LAW REV. 1015
(1985) (summary of the congressional proceedings leading up to passage of the National Or-
gan Transplant Act).
60. The National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 1984).
§ 274e. Prohibition of organ purchases
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) shall be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(c) For purposes of subsection (a):
(I) The term "human organ" means the human kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye bone, and skin, and any other
human organ specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
by regulation.
(2) The term "valuable consideration" does not include the reasona-
ble payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation,
processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or
the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a
human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.
(3) The term "interstate commerce" has the meaning prescribed for
it by section 201(b) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act [21
USCS § 321(b)].
61. 1d.
62. See infra note 63.
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436 to -441
(Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25956-25957 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(7) (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-26, -32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); LA. REV.
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dermine the uniformity of the UAGA as it relates to the donation of
dead fetuses and fetal remains. Six of these statutes impose an abso-
lute prohibition on the use of dead fetuses,6" thereby overriding the
provisions of the UAGA. Other states either adopt the provisions of
the UAGA as they relate to the donation of dead fetuses 6 or modify
those provisions slightly."8
If a fetus or fetal material is not specifically donated under the
UAGA or the National Organ Transplant Act, but rather is left to
the hospital or clinic for disposal, various state regulations and com-
mon law concepts may control. At early common law no property
right existed in a dead body,67 and the state's interest was limited to
ensuring the public health."6 In a recent case, Georgia Lions Eye
Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,69 the Georgia Supreme Court reiterated the
current concept that relatives do have a quasi-property interest in
bodies of their next of kin.70 Such a right, however, is not constitu-
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.15 (2688)
(Callaghan 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421-422 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-108(3)-108(4) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-342 to -346 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A, -3, -5 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
02.2-01 to -02 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-54-1 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-4-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302A (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-32 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1986) OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-735A (West 1984).
65. Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.421-.422 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3)-108(4) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-342-346
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A, -3, -5 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436 to -441 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25956-25957 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.15 (2688) (Callaghan 1980); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1987).
67. "But though the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ances-
tors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against such as
indecently at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead and buried."
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 429 (T. Cooley ed. 1899) quoted in Georgia Lions Eye
Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 61, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1464 (1986).
68. Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 502, 149 S.W. 871, 873 (1912) (body may
not be disposed of in a manner injurious to the health of the community).
69. 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985).
70. "It seems reasonably obvious that such 'property' is something evolved out of thin
air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer." PROSSER & KEATON, PROSSER
AND KEATON ON TORTS 63 (5th ed. 1984) quoted in Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,
255 Ga. 60, 61, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1985).
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tionally protected 71 and can be changed by legislative action.
In Georgia, the parents of a dead infant sued a hospital and an
eyebank for wrongful removal of their infant's corneal tissue.72 The
removal occurred pursuant to a statute that permitted removal of the
corneal tissue for transplant when no objection is made by the dece-
dent in his life or by the next of kin after death. 8 While the parents
did not object, there was no notice to them of the intended removal;
therefore, they were not given a realistic opportunity to object. 4 In
declaring the common law quasi-property right in dead bodies not to
be of constitutional dimension, the court ruled that the legislature
could vary common law as public health needs might dictate.7 Thus,
if fetal tissue becomes a needed public health resource, this case in-
dicates that states could authorize its use for transplant without no-
tice to the parents.
Before the advent of fetal tissue implant possibilities, fetal re-
mains were of limited value." State statutes that have addressed the
question of fetal disposal" tend to be informational, report promot-
ing procedures.7 8 In 1983, however, the Supreme Court in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. 9 struck down
an ordinance which, among other provisions, required that "fetal re-
mains be disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." 80 Ruling
that the provision was impermissibly vague,81 the Court held that it
71. See id. at 61, 335 S.E.2d at 128.
72. Id. at 60, 335 S.E.2d at 128.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 60-61, 335 S.E.2d at 128-29. See also Florida v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188
(Fla. 1986); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 138 Mich. App. 683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984)
(Both upholding similar statute permitting the post-mortem removal of cornea tissue without
consent of the survivors.).
76. See, e.g., RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 9, at 33,545 ("[A] final class of
investigation (falling outside the present mandate of the Commission) has made use of tissues
of the dead fetus, in accordance with accepted standards for treatment of the human cadaver.
The Commission finds that, to the best of its knowledge, these types of research have not
contravened accepted ethical standards.").
77. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-436 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25957(a) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(7) (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
81-32 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.14 (West Supp. 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-309 (1978). Compare statutes addressing experimentation or re-
search, infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
78. Contra Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (up-
holding a Missouri statute that mandated pathological examination of tissue from abortions
and other surgery performed in hospitals).
79. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
80. AKRON OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.16 (1978), quoted in City of
Akron, 462 U.S. at 424, n.7.
81. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 451 (quoting the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the same
case, 651 F.2d 1198, 1211 (6th Cir. 1981)).
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was unclear that the stated intent to "preclude the mindless dumping
of aborted fetuses into garbage piles" 2 did not also "mandate some
sort of decent burial of an embryo at the earliest stages of forma-
tion."83 Because criminal liability resulted, the level of uncertainty
was fatal8" to the statute.
In addition to the problem of vagueness, state disposal statutes
have also been held unconstitutional on the grounds that they imper-
missibly burden a woman's decision to have an abortion. A Louisi-
ana regulation that required a physician to tell a woman after an
abortion that she must choose between burial and other means of
disposal was struck down in Margaret S. v. Treen.85 The regulation
created the same psychological burden feared in a previous case,
Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick." In Fitzpatrick, the
court, while upholding a Pennsylvania statute providing for the hu-
mane disposal of fetal remains, went on to say that it is possible that
future regulations might impermissibly burden the abortion deci-
87sion. Such an impermissible burden is exactly what the district
court in Treen found. It held that the Louisiana statute requiring a
woman to choose the method of disposal would have a chilling effect
on a woman's decision to obtain an abortion and was thus
unconstitutional.
8 8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the Treen deci-
82. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 451 (quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick,
401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975)), afd. mem. sub. nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 (1976)).
83. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 451 (quoting the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the same
case, 651 F.2d 1198, 1211 (6th Cir. 1981)).
84. Id. at 451; Compare Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554,
572-73 (E.D. Pa. 1975), afd. mem. sub. nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976)
(upholding a Pennsylvania disposal statute because the statute did not impose criminal liabil-
ity, but rather, it only provided for regulations to implement the disposal requirement).
85. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
86. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428
U.S. 901 (1976).
87. The court, while upholding the Pennsylvania statute providing for humane disposal
of dead fetuses, went on to say:
Of course, a regulation that requires expensive burial may very well invade
the privacy of the pregnant woman and burden her decision concerning an abor-
tion. However, no such regulation has been adopted to date pursuant to section
5(c), and we find that this section is not unconstitutional on its face. We, of
course, do not foreclose a future challenge to any unconstitutional regulation
adopted pursuant to this section.
Id. at 573.
88. "By requiring the physician to confront the woman with a choice on the method of
disposal, the state suggests to the woman that it equates abortion with the taking of a human
life .... This requirement thus penalizes those women who exercise their constitutional right
in choosing abortion." Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 670.
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sion, 9 did so on narrower grounds. The court held only that the re-
quirement that the physician personally inform the woman after
abortion about options for disposal of fetal remains made the statute
unconstitutional." The court specifically left open the question that a
statute which allowed someone other than the attending physician to
provide information about options for disposal would be
constitutional .91
The Treen decision, when viewed in the light of Georgia Eye
Bank, raises questions of informed consent by the mother to the use
of dead fetal remains. If such consent is not required by due process
standards, a discussion of any type of disposal by a physician may
even be forbidden as having a chilling effect on the abortion decision.
Civil tort cases have dovetailed with the decision in Treen by al-
lowing recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress when
women have been given psychologically damaging information con-
cerning the disposition of fetal remains.91 These cases, however, oc-
curred when hospitals contradicted a woman's decision rather than
pre-empted it and also involved deaths at or shortly after birth
rather than abortions.
If fetal remains are used for implants or other research without
the woman's consent, or perhaps even her knowledge, other property
issues are raised. In a pending California case, Moore v. Regents of
University of California,93 the plaintiff had his spleen removed as
part of the treatment for a rare form of leukemia. The plaintiff's
physician allegedly used the patient's blood without his knowledge or
consent to create a cell line ultimately patented by the University of
California. 9 The plaintiff is claiming that his blood cells were mis-
appropriated and that he is entitled to a share in any profits derived
89. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
90. Id. at 998.
91. Id.
92. See McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 167 Ga. App. 495, 306 S.E.2d 746 (1983)
(allowing recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress when a woman, believing the
hospital had disposed of her stillborn child, was informed that the body was in frozen storage
and she could still pick it up): Johnson v. Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1975) (allowing recovery for breach of contract and punitive damages when, six weeks after
believing the hospital had properly disposed of her premature baby who had died shortly after
birth, a woman was shown the child floating in a jar of formaldehyde).
93. No. BO 21195 (Cal. Ct. App., filed May 15, 1986 & Aug. 28, 1986, consolidated
Dec. 5, 1986).
94. See generally Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Properly
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207 (1986) (discussing
property rights in human tissue and advocating that each person has the right to the commer-
cial potential of his or her own body).
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from any commercial uses of these cells.'" This case, unless settled,
will create valuable precedent in the area of property rights of
human tissue and duties of the physician to inform a patient of pos-
sible uses of the patient's own tissue.
The ownership issue is also one of concern in using fetal tissue.
One company, Hana Biologics, is using fetal tissue to grow neural
and pancreatic cells. 96 The company expects to begin clinical trials
with the pancreatic cells later this year." If successful, profits are
projected to be enormous in the next few years." A spokesperson for
the company, Nancy Peterson, stated that the tissue comes from
"third-party non-profit procuring agencies."" One such agency is
the subject of a recent investigation. 100 The Foundation on Economic
Trends'01 charged the National Disease Research Interchange
("NDRI") in Philadelphia with obtaining fetal tissue from hospitals
that did not perform all possible tests to determine if aborted fetuses
were dead prior to removing organs and other materials. 102 In deny-
ing the allegations, Lee Ducat, president of NDRI, said that her
group has proper death documentation on all tissue. 03
Fetal tissue makes up less than one percent of all the material
NDRI receives from a nationwide network of organ banks and hos-
pitals. 104 Presently, fetal remains, unless specifically claimed, can be
95. See generally New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues
and Cells - Special Report, OTA-BA 337 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
March 1987) (summarizing legal, ethical, policy, and economic considerations and suggesting
options for congressional action in regard to property rights in one's own tissue. The report
specifically states that it does not explore the special concerns arising from the use of fetal cells
for research); Wagner, Human Tissue Research: Who Owns the Results?, 69 J. PAT. TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 329 (1987) (arguing that human tissue belongs to no one and is rather
available to all); Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 28 (Oct. 1986)
(arguing that people possess property rights in their own bodies, particularly the regenerative
parts); Mathews, Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 192 (1983)
(arguing that while there can be no property right in a whole body, such rights do exist in
parts of bodies).
96. Lewin, supra note 3, at A30, col. 5.
97. Id.
98. Today (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 7, 1987).
99. Lewin, supra note 3, at A30, col. 5.
100. Hilts, NIH Probes Allegations of Live Fetal Tissue Use, Washington Post, Sept. 9,
1987, at A4, col. I.
101. Id. The foundation is a group headed by Jeremy Rifkin and is critical of research
related to genetic engineering.
102. Leary, Fetal-tissue Supplier Accused of Violations, Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 9,
1987, at GI, col. 3. National Disease Research Interchange is a non-profit organization set up
by the National Institute of Health to act as a clearing house for human tissue used in re-
search. As such, it must comply with all federal regulations concerning research on live fe-
tuses. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. It must also comply with any state
regulations concerning the use of dead fetuses. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at GI, col. 4.
104. Id.
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given by hospitals to non-profit groups such as NDRI and used by
companies like Hana Biologics as a foundation for profit-making
products. These products would also presumably have an equally
enormous therapeutic value. Questions are thus raised concerning
the commercial value of fetal tissue. If women are prohibited from
making money from a sale of fetal tissue, many feel that companies
should be precluded as well.10 5 However, without a profit incentive,
the benefits of such a therapy may never be realized.
B. Fetal Tissue from Non-Viable Fetuses Ex-Utero
In the wake of Roe v. Wade,106 stories surfaced in the press of
live but aborted fetuses being used for medical research in objection-
able ways.107 Responding to the public outrage, Congress passed the
National Research Act' 01 which contained two provisions regarding
research on the fetus. The first created the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search. Congress gave this Commission a mandate, with a deadline
of four months, to investigate research involving the fetus and to rec-
ommend whether and under what circumstances such research
should be supported by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.' 09 In addition, the law contained a ban on fetal research
until the Commission made its recommendations, except when such
research was intended to preserve the life of that specific fetus." 0
The result of this mandate was a report entitled Research on the
Fetus"' which later became the basis for federal regulations."'
105. Lewin, supra note 3, at A30, col. 5, quoting Professor Nadine Taub of the
Women's Rights Litigation Clinic at the Rutgers University Law School: "It's a hard one,
whether fetuses should be treated as renewable body tissue that can be sold, or as organs that
can't be. I don't think fetal tissue should be saleable. And it seems to me that if women can't
make money off it, companies shouldn't be able to make money off it, either."
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. Cases of objectionable research are objectively surveyed by Mahoney, The Nature
and Extent of Research Involving Living Human Fetuses, in Appendix, supra note 39, 1-1 to
1-48.
108. Pub. L. No. 93-348, Title II, § 213, 88 Stat. 353 (1974).
109. Id.
110. Id. For a discussion of the events leading up to the National Research Act, see
Fletcher and Schulman, supra note 9, at 6. For a discussion of the impact of this moratorium
on fetal research and the impact of the Commission's report, see Levine, The Impact on Fetal
Research of the Report of The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 22 VILL. L. REV. 367 (1976-77).
111. RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 9. For a survey of recent fetal research and
how the regulations affect such endeavors, see Fletcher and Schulman, supra note 9.
112. Protection of Human Subjects, Subpart B - Additional Protections Pertaining to
Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and
Human In Vitro Fertilization, 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-.211 (1986).
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These federal regulations define a non-viable fetus as "a fetus
ex utero which although living is not viable.""' "Viable" is defined
as "being able, after either spontaneous or induced delivery, to sur-
vive (given the benefit of available medical therapy) to the point of
independently maintaining heartbeat and respiration."" " If a fetus is
viable, it is treated like a premature infant." 5 If it is non-viable, the
regulations require that it cannot be used as a subject of research
unless the following four conditions are met: 1) vital functions will
not be artificially maintained; 2) experimental activities which would
terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be em-
ployed; 3) the purpose is the development of important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means; and 4) the
mother and father are legally competent and have given their in-
formed consent.1' 6 The father's consent is not necessary if his where-
abouts are unknown, he is not reasonably available, or the pregnancy
resulted from rape."
7
In addition, the issue of fetal research is also addressed by gen-
eral sections of the Basic Policy for Protection of Human Research
Subjects." 8 Pursuant to these regulations, each project must be ap-
proved by an Institutional Review Board." 9 The criteria for approval
require that the risks to the subject are minimized and bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the anticipated benefits.' 20 General limita-
tions also apply,' 2 ' some with parallels to the UAGA. For example,
individuals engaged in the research activity are not permitted to take
part in the decision, timing, or method of terminating the pregnancy
or the determination of the viability of the fetus.' 22 Obviously this is
intended to minimize any potential conflict of interest between the
physician and patient. Nonetheless, these regulations fail to antici-
pate the potential conflict inherent when conception occurs for the
purpose of abortion.
Another important regulation which imposes further limitations
113. 45 C.F.R. 46.203(e) (1986).
114. 45 C.F.R. 46.203(d) (1986). This section also specifies that "[T]he Secretary may
from time to time, taking into account medical advances, publish in the Federal Register
guidelines to assist in determining whether a fetus is viable for purposes of this subpart." Id.
115. Id.
116. 45 C.F.R. 46.209(b)-(d) (1986).
117. 45 C.F.R. 46.209(d) (1986).
118. Basic Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, Subpart A, 45 C.F.R. §
46.101-46.124 (1986).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(h) (1986).
120. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)-(b) (1986).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206 (1986).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(3) (1986).
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on the area of fetal research is the restriction placed upon facilities
funded by the Department of Health and Human Services. This reg-
ulation provides that "no inducements monetary or otherwise may be
offered to terminate pregnancy for purposes of the activity. 12 3 Thus,
it appears that the sale of fetal tissue may be prohibited if the re-
search is at all funded by Health and Human Services. If such fund-
ing is not a consideration, and unless prohibited by state statute, the
restriction is inapplicable.
In attempting to apply these regulations to the use of fetal tis-
sue implants, several problems are apparent. These regulations de-
fine research as "a systematic investigation designed to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge. 11 24 This definition differs
from the specific recommendations of the Commission that distin-
guished between therapeutic and non-therapeutic research126 involv-
ing fetuses. As finally adopted, the regulations on fetal research con-
tained no such distinctions.
While the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic
is not made explicit in a definition section, it can be inferred from a
careful reading of the regulations. Activities are not permitted on a
viable fetus ex-utero unless there will be no added risk and the pur-
pose of the activity is the development of important biomedical
knowledge that cannot be obtained by other means or the survival of
that particular fetus.1 26 The regulations concerning the non-viable
fetus only state that the purpose of the activity is the development of
important biomedical knowledge that cannot be obtained by other
means.
127
When the Commission made its recommendations and adopted
the Department of Health regulations, this kind of technology was
unknown. As stated, the purpose of the recommendations was to con-
trol a perceived exploitation of fetuses in the wake of Roe v.
123. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(4)(b) (1986).
124. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e) (1986).
125. RESEARCH ON THE FETUS, supra note 9, at 33,545-33,548. These distinctions have
sparked vigorous debate. See Horan, Fetal Experimentation and Fetal Regulation, 22 VILL. L.
REV. 325 (1976-77) (arguing that therapeutic research is a contradiction in terms - that all
non-therapeutic research involving unborn whether in-utero or ex-utero should be prohibited.
The author advocates using only the term research and analyzing any proposal without the
confusion of terms therapeutic or non-therapeutic research.). See also RESEARCH ON THE FE-
TUS, supra note 9, at 33,550-33,551 (concurring statement of Commissioner); Lebacoz, Reflec-
tions on the Report and Recommendations of the National Commission: Research on the
Fetus, 22 VILL. L. REV. 357 (1976-77) (essentially agreeing with the conclusion that this dis-
tinction obscures the nature of the research).
126. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(1) (1986).
127. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(3) (1986).
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Wade.1" While permitting non-therapeutic research or experimenta-
tion on the non-viable fetus ex-utero, the regulations are silent with
regard to therapeutic use. Depending upon the type of tissue needed
for implants, it may be necessary to violate the prohibition against
maintaining artificial functions. It is also impossible not to violate
the second condition that activities which would terminate the heart-
beat and respiration of the fetus cannot be employed.
There is a possibility of a waiver of some of these specific re-
quirements. " All funded projects involving human subjects must be
reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB). s°
In addition, the regulations involving fetuses, pregnant women and
in-vitro fertilization provide for the establishment of a national Ethi-
cal Advisory Board (EAB). 13' Upon request of an IRB, the EAB can
recommend waiving or modifying the specific requirements, but only
after public comment."3 2 The Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices then makes a final determination by considering "whether the
risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit to
the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to
warrant such modification or waiver ... ."I"a This waiver possibil-
ity is unlikely to occur in the case of fetal tissue implants because it
requires a showing that the subject will benefit. Clearly these antici-
pated technologies cannot be used in compliance with the regulations
if the fetal implants require the removal of tissue from a non-viable
but not yet dead fetus ex-utero. Federal funding would therefore be
impossible.
C. State Regulations on Fetal Research
The federal regulations provide that compliance in no way ren-
ders inapplicable any state laws also covering fetal research.""a In
addition, the regulations only govern those activities funded or con-
ducted by the Department of Health and Human Services.' As be-
128. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 46.211 (1986).
130. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
131. 45 C.F.R. § 46.204 (1986).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 46.211 (1986).
133. Id. (emphasis added). The role of the Ethical Review Board is thoroughly discussed
by Fletcher and Schulman, supra note 9, at 7-11. They note that fetal research has been
greatly hampered by the fact that the Ethical Advisory Board ("EAB") was allowed to lapse
when its charter and funding expired in 1980. Noting that lack of an EAB has created a gulf
between local and national considerations of fetal research, they urgently call for its reestab-
lishment. Id.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1986).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(a) (1986). Except to the extent that a funded research institu-
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fits such a controversial topic, twenty-five state legislatures have en-
acted statutes regulating fetal research.""s
Nineteen states ban any non-therapeutic research on a living
abortus. 13' At the other extreme, two states, Arkansas and Utah,
permit all types of fetal research on a living abortus.'3 8 The other
four states either precondition such research on maternal consent1 89
or on the lack of risk to the abortus. 40 The lack of uniformity
among the state regulations is apparent given the various approaches
outlined in these statutes.
Furthermore, even states which have similar regulations cannot
agree on their interpretation. For example, in Wynn v. Scott,"" an
Illinois case, the court upheld a state statute prohibiting experimen-
tation on dead fetuses, while the Louisiana case of Margaret S. v.
Treen struck down a similar statute. 1 2 The district court in Treen
held the statute unconstitutional because it limited medical informa-
tion obtainable through experiments on the dead fetuses that might
prove beneficial to the mother. 4 The prohibition thus burdened the
exercise of a woman's fundamental right to an abortion."
The Treen court distinguished its decision from the Wynn ra-
tionale by pointing out that the court in Wynn found no evidence of
an infringement of a fundamental right and that the statute ques-
tion must gain approval for "[a] statement of principles governing the institution in discharge
of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research con-
ducted at or sponsored by the institution regardless of source of funding" (45 C.F.R.
46.103(b)(1)), there is no interference with research conducted without federal funds.
136. See supra note 63. See also Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the States, 15
HASTINGS CEN. REP. 12 (1985) (giving a history of state legislative action and the resulting
variability in state statutes).
137. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.2302A (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25956(a) (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 81-26(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 535-1-58.5-6 [10-112] (Burns
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp.
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 112, §
12J(a)(I) (West 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.15 (2685) (Callaghan 1980); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-342 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-01.2-01 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.14(A) (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 35-
6-115 (1978).
138. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-437 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978).
139. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977); TENN CODE ANN. § 39-4-208
(1982).
140. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9-A-4 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422(1) (West Supp.
1985).
141. 449 F. Supp. 1302 (1978) (N.D. I11.), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction
sub. nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affing, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
142. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
143. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 673 (E.D. La. 1984).
144. Id.
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tioned in Wynn, while banning experimentation, specifically provided
for the pathological examination of tissue that might lead to infor-
mation beneficial to the mother.1"5 In affirming the Treen decision,
the court of appeals limited its holding to the fact that the terms
"experiment" and "experimentation" made the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague because it offered no guidance to a physician as to the
distinction between a medical test and a medical experiment. 46
In light of these decisions, state regulation of fetal research and
experimentation may be contingent upon whether such regulation,
by limiting a woman's access to medical information that might bear
on future pregnancy decisions, unconstitutionally burdens the abor-
tion decision. Many of these statutes, as they apply only to aborted
fetuses or discriminate between an induced or natural abortion, may
also be unconstitutionally vague. These statutes address research or
experimentation, either therapeutic or non-therapeutic. It is not clear
under what definition, if any, the beneficial use of fetal tissue would
fall.
IV. What Needs To Be Done
As noted, Research on the Fetus came as a result of a dramatic
societal change in 1973 - the legalization of abortion."1 7 The for-
mation of The National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, along with its re-
search, hearings, and final recommendations, were a reasoned and
measured response to this change. Although there is not total agree-
ment with the resulting regulations, there is no quarrel with the pro-
cess employed to develop them.",8 This process, however, occurred
over twelve years ago. Although the Commission attempted to pro-
vide for some flexibility, the use of fetal tissue for brain or other
implants was not contemplated and, as such, cannot be properly ad-
dressed under the current federal regulatory scheme."19 Moreover, as
illustrated above, state laws that supplement the federal regulations
vary widely and generally do not address this technology. 50
It is thus imperative to appoint another commission with a simi-
lar mandate to make recommendations on the use of fetal tissue and
145. Id.
146. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986).
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148. See generally Fletcher & Schulman, supra note 9; Horan, supra note 56; Nathan,
Fetal Research: An Investigator's View, 22 VILL. L. REv. 384 (1976-77).
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 114-46 and accompanying text.
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any other related technologies that have developed since the earlier
report. Like the first diverse group that made up the original Com-
mission, the members must be from medical, legal, and ethical fields
and possess the highest qualifications. Only by such a reasoned ap-
proach on a national scale can the benefits of fetal tissue implants be
fully realized in this country.
As this Comment demonstrates, access to such technology now
depends largely upon the state location of the medical facility and
the absence of federal funding. This situation cannot continue if the
benefits of these techniques prove to be as dramatic as anticipated.
Changes in the regulatory scheme must occur at a federal level and
these laws must not be viscerated by state legislatures.
The issues which must be addressed by a future commission and
Congress are similar to those questions addressed by the original
Commission and do not lend themselves to easy resolution. Never-
theless, several prohibitions and requirements must be addressed.
Foremost, under no circumstances should consent of the mother
be waived. Whether the tissue needed is from a dead fetus or a non-
viable fetus ex-utero, it must not be obtained without the informed
consent of the mother. Such informed consent need not result in the
constitutional concerns expressed in Margaret S. v. Treen. 51 A wo-
man decides, with a physician's advice, many medical issues con-
cerning her abortion, including the method and the time. Rather
than mandating that the physician inform the woman, someone other
than the doctor could be allowed to discuss the donation option, a
procedure left open by the court of appeals in affirming Treen.' 52 An
informed donation of fetal tissue is no more problematic than what is
currently prescribed by the UAGA153 or National Organ Transplant
Act.
154
A new law which became effective last October may serve as a
model for such consent. 155 The law requires that hospitals may not
participate in Medicare or Medicaid, unless they establish "written
protocols for the identification of potential organ donors. 1 56 Hospi-
tals must assure that families of potential donors are informed of
151. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984). See also supra notes 85-92 and accompanying
text.
152. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1986). See also supra notes
89-91 and accompanying text.
153. UAGA, supra note 45, at 34 (§ 2).
154. 2 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 1984).
155. Hospital Protocols for Organ Procurement and Standards for Organ Procurement
Agencies, 100 Stat. 2009 (1986).
156. Id.
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their option to donate organs and their option to decline. The proto-
cols must encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the cir-
cumstances, views, and beliefs of such families. The term organ is
defined as a human kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas and any
other organ or tissue specified by the Secretary.157 If fetal tissue
becomes a resource for transplants, there appears to be no reason
why it could not be included within this law.
Without such consent, however, there are possibilities for tort
recoveries for emotional distress if a woman should discover such tis-
sue was obtained without her permission."' A decision to have an
abortion, whether for medical or other reasons is not a casual one.
Indeed, it can be argued that knowledge that fetal tissue may be
used against her wishes or without her knowledge would be an im-
permissible burden upon a woman's decision to choose an abortion.
The method of and timing for an abortion is a woman's deci-
sion. It is possible that the type of abortion most suitable for preserv-
ing fetal tissue may not be the recommended method for a particular
woman. Only she, in consultation with her physician, should be able
to decide to elect one procedure over another.
Another important restriction that a commission should con-
sider is a prohibition upon the sale of fetal tissue. The coercion in-
herent in a monetary inducement may effectively deprive a woman
of informed consent. Additionally, if the sale of such tissue is permit-
ted, people will be willing to produce it for monetary gain. The po-
tential for exploitation of women in such a situation is unacceptable.
Because they are biologically able to reproduce, women could poten-
tially become part of a commodity market, particularly in third
world nations. Dr. Arthur Caplan159 summed up the Orwellian pos-
sibilities inherent in fetal tissue sales in a recent interview:
It doesn't take a whole lot of imagination to put yourself in
the situation of the third world where people could go around
offering ten cents, five cents, to women to serve as fetal farms
for tissue donation. I don't think that's a practice that we want
to be encouraging. I think part of the objection here, the ethics
concern, is that whatever we're doing between mothers and fe-
tuses, we don't want them thinking of the fetus as a thing, an
entity, a piece of property simply to chop up and parse out to
whoever happens to have a need or to whoever happens to want
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See supra note 92.
159. See supra note 30.
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to pay for it. 60
In addition to banning the sale or purchase of fetal tissue, a
donor must be barred from any participation in the selection of the
donee. Such an action prohibits the hypothetical couple, mentioned
at the beginning of this Comment, from donating fetal tissue to their
daughter. Any incentive to conceive with the intention of aborting
and donating the tissue is thus removed. Also removed is any famil-
ial pressure, real or perceived, upon women to conceive in order to
help an ill family member.
Such a prohibition has been suggested for live organ donors be-
cause of increased success with cadaver transplants. 6 ' The use of
the anti-rejection drug cyclosporin has almost equalized the rejection
rate between randomly matched organs and donors and those trans-
plants done between family members. 62 Such an equalization is
more likely for fetal tissue because it is so less likely to be
rejected."'
With 1.2 million abortions performed each year in this country,
supply of fetal tissue is not likely to become a problem. 64 While
mandating informed consent by the mother may restrict the availa-
bility, it may also increase it. Because an exact tissue match is not
required for success, eliminating a donor's ability to designate a do-
nee would not significantly alter the effectiveness of the implant.
Such a restriction would, however, place a check on conception in
order to abort.
Though feelings differ concerning the morality of abortion,
there is nevertheless a recognition that a fetus is different from other
body parts. Such a recognition is the foundation upon which the Re-
search on the Fetus recommendations, as well as state and federal
regulatory schemes, are built. Conception with the intention of using
the resulting fetal tissue is not an action to be encouraged. Fortu-
nately, the current state of technology does not force someone to
make the choice between an intentional conception for the purpose
of abortion or the endurance of a family member's suffering. If fetal
tissue transplants prove to be as beneficial as anticipated, such tissue
can be obtained without encouraging conception in order to abort.
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V. Conclusion
The use of fetal tissue for transplants in humans has incredible
potential to reverse or significantly improve many neurological and
other diseases. The current state of both federal and state law, how-
ever, does not adequately address how and under what conditions
such tissue could be obtained and used.
Without intervention on a national scale, there is the danger of
an industry developing that deals in fetal tissue for profit. The result-
ing potential for the exploitation of women and the trivialization of a
fetus in its non-viable state are unacceptable. National action must
be taken before such an industry is in place. Such national action
must mandate informed consent of the woman involved, prohibit the
purchase or sale of fetal tissue, and preclude donors from designat-
ing a specific person as donee. Only such action will avoid an ad hoc
random approach that ultimately will subordinate individual choices
to the demands of technology. For competing interests and benefits
to be reconciled and realized, there must be opportunity for these
concerns to be addressed, debated, and resolved in a national forum.
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